Open Justice: Public Scrutiny v. Individual Rights

By Trevor Archer

Was George Orwell correct to describe the anonymisation of reports as “the plague of initials”, or does protection from reputational harm in non-conviction based civil recovery litigation stem from a right to privacy that outweighs the principle of open justice? In the June 2026 edition of Focus, Red Lion Chambers’ Trevor Archer analyses the High Court’s recent ruling in NCA v GKC (No 2) [2026] EWHC 929 (Admin).

Introduction

When the judicial spotlight falls on individuals linked to criminal conduct — but when they are neither questioned nor charged with any criminality — a particularly delicate balancing act comes into play. Open justice must be weighed against the individual’s right to privacy. This tension is far from academic; it plays out with profound real-world consequences for those caught in the glare of public scrutiny.

In an age where news travels quickly and easily, being publicly associated with a criminal investigation may cause irrevocable damage to an individual’s reputation, personal relationships, and future career prospects. This risk is particularly acute in the context of unexplained wealth orders (“UWOs”). Such orders are only available where the respondent is a “politically exposed person” or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they, or somebody connected to them, has been involved in serious crime. Applications are likely to set out detailed information about the subject’s income and finances at a stage when the investigation and underlying evidence is embryonic. There is no guarantee that information about a person’s suspected links to serious criminal activity will be reported in a balanced or fair way. The mere suggestion of involvement in wrongdoing, even in the absence of charges, can cast a long shadow that lingers well beyond the resolution of any legal process.

Yet, as Mr Justice Kerr observed in Lu v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2022] EWHC 1729 (Admin), “the justice system thrives on the fearless naming of people.” Open justice is not a mere tradition. It is a vital safeguard, ensuring that courts remain subject to scrutiny, that justice is seen to be done, and that confidence in the legal system is maintained. Without transparency and accountability, public trust begins to erode.

That fundamental tension has recently been examined in detail in National Crime Agency v GCK [2026] EWHC 929 (Admin), in which Fordham J undertook a careful review of the boundaries of anonymity in court proceedings and the broader imperatives of open justice.

Background

“GCK” was a young overseas student who came to the UK on a visa that allowed her to first complete secondary education and then attend university. She was connected to people embroiled in a major money laundering scandal in Singapore. Assets worth $944 million had been forfeited from ten individuals, including her uncle and an associate of her father, who were convicted by the Singaporean authorities. A further fifteen people, including her father, had surrendered assets worth $1.85 billion.

At the age of 19, GCK purchased a flat in the UK worth £4 million. At 21, she acquired a second flat valued at £1.173 million. She also held £800,000 in bank accounts.

The National Crime Agency (“NCA”) suspected that these assets represented criminal property derived from money laundering. Without notice to GCK, they applied to the High Court for a UWO and an interim freezing order (“IFO”). The application for those orders was heard and determined at a private hearing.

GCK later applied to set aside the UWO and IFO. That application was heard at a public hearing during which the court granted interim anonymity and reporting restrictions. Media organisations intervened to oppose continued anonymisation. The NCA aligned itself with the media position.

Fordham J gave two judgments. In Judgment No.1 [2026] EWHC 573 (Admin), he dismissed the application to discharge the UWO and IFO. Judgment No.2 addressed whether the interim anonymity and reporting restrictions should continue.

Analysis

Private hearings and the UWO framework

Applying the presumption set out at paragraph 11.1 of the Practice Direction on Civil Recovery Proceedings and CPR r.39.2(3)—as explained in Hussain [2020] 1 WLR 2145—the NCA’s application for a UWO/IFO was heard and determined at a private hearing.

There is no equivalent presumption when the court considers an application to set aside a UWO. The starting point remains open justice.

Article 8 and reputational harm

GCK was a person of good character, living in the UK, with her working life and career ahead of her. She aspired to work in the financial sector. She argued that banks and financial institutions are highly likely to scrutinise public information about candidates, so being publicly associated with a money laundering investigation would devastate her career prospects.

The court accepted that allowing open reporting would amount to a serious and significant interference with her right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR. Publication of the fact that she was under investigation was likely to damage her reputation and prejudice her ability to establish and maintain relationships, both professionally and personally.

The Court also accepted that GCK sought only a limited derogation from open justice. She did not argue for secrecy as to the nature of the proceedings, the legal issues, the arguments advanced, or the Court’s reasoning—all of which could, she contended, be fully and meaningfully reported without identifying her.

The necessity test and open justice

The Court recognised that a UWO is an investigative tool deployed at an early stage and subject to a relatively low statutory threshold: reasonable grounds for suspicion. The purpose of such an order is purely to gather information.

The Court accepted that it had a safeguarding function whereby it independently assessed whether the statutory criteria were met before taking the intrusive step of compelling GCK to explain how she came to acquire her wealth. GCK had a right to effective judicial protection, which included challenging such an order. Open reporting of any such challenge, via the mechanism intended by Parliament, risked undermining the safeguarding rationale of the High Court’s statutory function because it would expose the recipient of the UWO to unwelcome public attention.

GCK relied on ZXC v Bloomberg [2022] UKSC 5, which establishes that individuals under criminal investigation generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy prior to charge. However, applying Marandi [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin) and Simms-Davis [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin), Fordham J emphasised that ZXC does not invert the starting point in court proceedings. Open justice remains the default. It is for the individual to show that any derogation from open justice is necessary to avoid disproportionate interference with their rights.

Whilst the arguments in favour of anonymisation were described as “powerful”, the Court considered that they did not meet the threshold of necessity so as to justify a derogation from open justice.

The public interest in identification

The Court placed substantial weight on the public interest served by publication of full, unredacted judgments. Naming the individual promoted understanding of how and why the Court reached its conclusions and avoided the problem of dehumanised or disembodied reporting.

Drawing on Re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1, the Court recognised that while names may be irrelevant to the legal analysis, anonymity carries a real disadvantage for the press. Reporting on nameless individuals diminishes public engagement and reduces the significance afforded to the case. As Lord Rodger observed in that case, without names “readers would be less interested and, realising that, editors would tend to give the report a lower priority.”

Although not cited in the judgment, Kerr J articulated a similar concern in Lu v SRA, warning against the “creeping march of anonymity and redaction”. What George Orwell described as a “plague of initials” undermines clarity and purpose: “Reading or writing reports about nameless people is tedious.”

Case‑specific context was also central. The proceedings arose from a vast, well‑publicised money‑laundering scandal in Singapore. The identities of GCK’s uncle, father, and father’s associate had already been widely reported overseas. Identifying GCK in the UK proceedings enabled the public to understand the broader significance of the case and to place the domestic litigation within its international context.

Procedure and Open Justice

The Court made observations about the procedure adopted in this case, which impacted press engagement with the proceedings.

· Listings: The Cause List used ciphers (“BOM v BMR”), obscuring even the identity of the NCA. Fordham J could see no justification for this. A listing such as National Crime Agency v BMR (Unexplained Wealth Order) would better promote transparency.

· Beginning hearings in public: The hearing of the NCA’s application initially began in public before moving into private session. Fordham J observed that this approach can, in appropriate cases, promote open justice.

· Publication of orders: CPR r.39.2(5) requires publication of orders where hearings are held in private or anonymity is ordered, unless the court directs otherwise. This issue was not addressed during the hearing of the NCA’s application, nor was the Court invited to consider announcing publicly that a UWO and IFO had been granted, albeit on private terms.

Conclusion

A person served with a UWO following a private, without‑notice hearing will ordinarily benefit from anonymity at that preliminary stage. If they later seek to challenge the order in public proceedings, careful strategic judgment is required. Contesting the order may expose them to public identification; compliance, by contrast, may allow them to avoid ever being publicly linked to the investigation.

In this case, had GCK failed to demonstrate the lawful origin of her wealth, her identity would almost certainly have entered the public domain in subsequent POCA proceedings. Conversely, had she complied with the UWO and established legitimate provenance, she might never have been publicly named at all.

Although the decision arose in the context of UWOs and IFOs, the principles articulated are likely to have wider application—for example, to individuals named but not charged in forfeiture proceedings, or to those identified in Deferred Prosecution Agreements without facing criminal liability.

More broadly, judgments such as this arrive at a pivotal moment. As courts grapple with mounting pressures and proposed reforms that risk diminishing public engagement with the justice system, the reaffirmation of open justice is timely and necessary. Anonymity and redaction do not foster public confidence. Transparency does. Open justice fosters engagement and reassures the public that the law is applied fairly, rigorously, and impartially—and that assurance remains indispensable to the integrity of the justice system.

Post script: permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted in principle by Fordham J and we wait to see if GCK appeals the ruling. For an update and news of other rulings anticipated soon on anonymity, please see forthcoming Red Lion Chambers Fraud Newsletters.

Trevor Archer specialises in financial, business & regulatory crime, including global investigations.

Ed Vickers KC Editor of Focus.

Faras Baloch Editor of the Fraud Newsletter.